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ABSTRACT 
 By creating islands in the Spratlys and placing airfields, radars, and missiles on 
them, China fundamentally changed Great Power Competition (GPC). To measure and 
understand these changes within relevant policy communities, this thesis asks two 
questions: First, how did Spratly militarization impact U.S-China competition within 
GPC using a diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) framework? 
Second, how did Spratly militarization affect maritime strategy? 
 Using data within each DIME category and scholarly analysis, this thesis finds 
that Spratly militarization significantly impacted competition informationally and 
militarily but with lesser impact to diplomacy and economics. Within maritime strategy, 
Spratly militarization displayed an entirely new concept that this thesis defines as sea 
assurance. Using this new terminology, this thesis finds that Spratly militarization 
provided China with ability to protect or control more than half of the South China Sea, 
including a major sea line of communication and multiple maritime chokepoints. 
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Less than a decade ago, no country wielded land-based missiles from any island in 
the South China Sea (SCS). Today, China is capable of launching modern anti-ship and 
surface-to-air missiles from its outposts in the Spratly Islands. By creating and arming 
islands adjacent to major sea lines of communication (SLOC), China changed maritime 
strategy for any country with economic, political, or security interests in the SCS; but 
experts disagree about the overall strategic impact of those changes, particularly as it 
relates to modern Great Power Competition (GPC).  
By establishing island-like features specifically for the purpose of defending 
disputed territory in the SCS, China demonstrated a new form of maritime strategy. The 
Spratly Islands area includes hundreds of features, many of which are below the water at 
high tide. Before 2014, three relevant features—Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi 
Reef—were barely above water at low tide. Unlike existing maritime strategy practices—
sea control, coastal defense, anti-access area denial, etc.—China, in peacetime, created dry 
land within a disputed area and promptly equipped that land with radars, missiles, and port 
facilities. Technological development made this feat possible only within the last two 
decades; building militarized outposts on fabricated islands is a never-before-utilized 
maritime strategy worth analysis.  
In obsolete charting maps, the Spratly Islands were not labeled as the territory of 
any state, but simply “dangerous grounds,” largely because no country cared to claim 
them.1 Though they are called the Spratly Islands, a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration stipulated that none of the features were truly islands, but rather “rocks or 
low-tide elevations.”2 Over the last few decades, access to resources and trade routes made 
the Spratlys more desirable. In 2016, Katherine Morton characterized disputes in the SCS, 
 
1 Clarence J. Bouchat, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and U.S. Interest and Approaches, 
Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 1.  
2 Euan Graham, “The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning 
Influence?” Council on Foreign Relations, August 18, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-
memos/hague-tribunals-south-china-sea-ruling-empty-provocation-or-slow-burning-influence. 
2 
writing, “this juxtaposition between historic struggles over maritime rights and the shifting 
boundaries of maritime order means that the prospects for regional stability now hang in 
the balance. China’s quest to become a global maritime power is the crucial link between 
the past and the future that could tip the balance of state interests in either a positive or a 
negative direction.”3 In simpler words, the SCS is crucial to regional stability; China’s 
actions there matter.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MAIN FINDINGS 
First, this thesis analyzes the military, economic, and political ramifications of this 
militarization and seeks to answer the following questions: What is the strategic 
significance for China of its militarization of the Spratly Islands and how has militarization 
affected China’s standing in GPC? Specifically, has Spratly militarization benefited China 
diplomatically, informationally, militarily, and/or economically (DIME)? Separately, this 
thesis seeks to answer the question: How has China’s militarization in the Spratly’s 
impacted maritime strategy? In response to this question, this thesis proposes a new term 
in maritime strategy: sea assurance, the peacetime establishment of permanent or semi-
permanent anti-ship capabilities covering international or disputed waters.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
These research questions are significant because they concern the SCS, one of five 
areas identified by international relations expert Graham Allison as holding potential for 
conflict between the United States and China.4 More specifically, the research questions 
are important for at least four reasons. First, to understand the nuances of renewed GPC, 
one must understand the various games being played on the global stage and the respective 
arenas those games occupy. The maritime strategy research question focuses on the Spratly 
Islands as the arena and asks how their militarization affected the rest of the gameboard.  
 
3 Katherine Morton, “China’s Ambition in the South China Sea: Is a Legitimate Maritime Order 
Possible?” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016): 910.  
4 Richard Javad Heydarian, The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Struggle for Global Mastery 
(Singapore: Springer Nature, 2020), 2.  
3 
Second, this research is significant in relation to the categories of DIME—
diplomacy, information, military, and economics. In diplomacy, this research evaluates 
significant changes (both regional and global) due to Spratly militarization. 
Informationally, the questions define significant capabilities gained by Spratly 
militarization and strengthening of political narratives formed by China. Militarily, this 
research explores significant advantages gained by Spratly militarization in both combat 
scenarios and deterrence. In economics, this research explores the relationship of Spratly 
militarization to China’s larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), control of major SLOCs, 
and control of natural resources. 
Third, these research questions fit into larger international relations debates on the 
theoretical (and real) struggle between China and the United States. Specifically, these 
research questions apply to nuances of realist arguments—the diplomatic ramifications of 
Spratly militarization related to what Stephen Walt calls “balancing” or “band-wagoning” 
and accusations that Xi Jinping seeks “Asian hegemony.”5  
Lastly, the second research question explores fundamental developments in 
maritime strategy and proposes a new term: sea assurance, the peacetime establishment of 
anti-ship capability in disputed/international waters. Similar to the concept of “Command 
of the Sea,” as described by Alfred Mahan and his naval theory successors, sea assurance 
involves establishing military advantage of the sea prior to a conflict, potentially as a 
deterrent to conflict.6  This research analyzes China’s militarization of the Spratly Islands 
in the context of sea assurance and evaluate its implications for other aspects of GPC.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To fully capture the intertwining aspects of this study, three overarching 
discussions must be addressed and evaluated: China’s intent in militarizing the Spratly 
 
5 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 147–180; “China’s 
Missile Offense: Beijing is Militarizing Island Outposts in the South China Sea,” Wall Street Journal 
(Online), Feb 18, 2016, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1766108846?accountid=12702.  
6 Alfred Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Co., 
1890); Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons,” International Security 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003): 5–46. 
4 
Islands, the strategic significance of the SCS, and what is required for China to gain sea 
assurance. Each of these debates involves different schools of thought.  
1. China’s Intent in Militarizing the Spratly Islands 
The question of China’s military intent in the SCS is largely debated amongst 
international relations theorists and military analysts/policymakers. To simplify the broad 
and complicated arguments, three schools of thought exist: China’s behavior in the SCS 
threatens United States interests; China’s behavior in the SCS does not threaten United 
States interests; or China’s actions are not binarily determinable.  
The first school of thought includes those that suggest China holds threatening and 
offensive intent in the SCS and point to China’s actions as being counter to international 
law and aggressive seizing of disputed territory. China’s relevant actions, in this case, are 
its seizure of disputed territories in the Spratly Islands, in the Paracel Islands, and 
Scarborough Shoal. Aaron Friedberg suggests China is “both ambitious and deeply 
insecure” and would “use every instrument at their disposal to reshape Asia and the world 
in ways that serve their interests.”7 In this article, Friedberg adopts a cynical view of 
China’s actions and its implications for future international developments. Jansen Tham 
points out, in a 2018 article, “most worryingly, the deployment of missiles—for the first 
time—provides China with offensive power projection capabilities, augmenting its existing 
anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) naval strategy against its primary rival, the United 
States.”8 The missile deployment Tham refers to are on three outposts in the Spratly Islands 
that were mostly underwater reefs before 2013. In 2013 and 2014, China quickly dredged 
massive amounts of sand from the ocean floor to form islands and proceeded, in 2018, to 
 
7 Aaron Friedberg, “The Signs Were There,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 4 (July/August 2018): 188, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/2058267252?accountid=12702. 




arm these islands with airfields, radars, and missiles.9 In his 2020 book, Richard Javad 
Heydarian describes China’s increased maritime assertiveness as “an important indication 
of the calibrated nature of its (expansionist) maritime strategy, which is sensitive to the 
prevailing balance of power or alignment of forces (Shi) in the international system.”10 In 
essence, Heydarian accuses China of taking advantage of a void in international oversight 
by quickly creating and militarizing areas of disputed territory for an expansionist gain.  
The second school of thought includes scholars who contend that China’s actions 
in the SCS are entirely defensive and nonthreatening. Zhou Fangyin counters the 
accusation of China’s aggressive behavior by stating, “Ironically, the adoption of a more 
assertive approach by China over the SCS disputes is very much defensive in nature, with 
the key aim of preventing losses.”11 Zhou’s article acknowledges many of the flags 
alarmists point to regarding China’s behavior, but claims they miss the intricacies that are 
more consistent with a defensive state.12 Zhu Feng goes a step further by suggesting that 
China’s claim is legitimate and any international criticism is irrelevant. In a 2015 article, 
Zhu states, “Conducted in accordance with international laws, China’s IRC [island and reef 
construction] activities on the Nansha Islands are infrastructure construction activities 
within Chinese territory. Foreign countries can observe, but they have no right to point 
fingers at China.”13 Zhu suggests that China’s activity is solely for the purposes of 
“improving the living conditions of island inhabitants, national defense, scientific research, 
ecological protection, etc., is by nature the fundamental rights of a maritime country.”14 
To those that criticize China’s activities, he accuses them of maliciously sensationalizing 
 
9 Michael Smith, “China Missile Reports Eclipse U.S. Trade Talks,” The Australian Financial Review, 
May 5, 2018, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/2034275004?accountid=12702. 
10 Heydarian, The Indo-Pacific, 171. 
11 Zhou Fangyin, “Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: Understanding China’s South China Sea 
Policy,” International Affairs 92, No. 4 (2016): 889. 
12 Zhou, “Between Assertiveness,” 870.  
13 Feng Zhu, “Will Island and Reef Construction Change the Status Quo in South China Sea,” China 
International Studies 52 (May/June,2015): 16. 
14 Zhu, 16. 
6 
the topic because “China is not yet powerful enough to engage in equal dialogue with the 
United States on Asia-Pacific maritime issues.”15 If threat requires intent and capability, 
Zhu suggests the latter is absent, regardless of the former. Michael Beckley offers a similar 
suggestion in his 2018 book. He argues that China’s relative power is misconstrued and is 
not equal to the United States in “net” power, the amount of power a country gains minus 
the costs of achieving or using it.16 
The third school of thought includes scholars who avoid the debate over China’s 
exact intent and focus on what the United States and China can do to avoid a potential 
gravitation toward war—a risk that Allison calls the “Thucydides Trap” and what John 
Mearsheimer describes as “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.”17 Though Allison first used the 
phrase “Thucydides Trap” in a 2015 article and developed the concept into a 2017 book, 
he claims that China and the United States are capable of mitigating the major conflict that 
plagued great powers for centuries. Philip Saunders and Julie Bowie published articles on 
United States and China competition and cooperation both before and after China put 
missiles on the Spratly Islands; their claim is “the two countries will maintain an 
ambiguous relationship marked by a mixture of cooperation and competition” and military 
relationships are key to preventing misunderstandings.18  
  
 
15 Zhu, 32.  
16 Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2018), 1–15.  
17 John Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (April 2006): 160–
162. http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/200776171?accountid=12702; Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can 
America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 12.  
18 Phillip C. Saunders and Julia G. Bowie, “US–China Military Relations: Competition and 
Cooperation,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, vol. 5–6 (2016): 679, DOI: 
10.1080/01402390.2016.1221818; Phillip C. Saunders and Julia C Bowie, “US–China Military Relations: 
Competition and Cooperation in the Obama and Trump Eras,” Reshaping the Chinese Military: The PLA’s 
Roles and Missions in the Xi Jinping Era 1, (2019): 103, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429465109-5. 
7 
2. Strategic Importance of the SCS   
The complicated perception and importance of this body of water is evident even 
in its name. The body of water this research refers to as the SCS is also known as the East 
Sea by Vietnam and the West Philippine Sea by the Philippines.19 In addition to the many 
claims on it, scholars discuss the SCS’s strategic importance largely in three categories: 
diplomatic, economic, and military. Figure 1 depicts the various claims. 
 
Figure 1. Rival Claims in the SCS20 
 
19 Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (London: Yale University Press, 
2014), ix. 
20 Source: John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 
2014), 371. 
8 
The first category is the SCS’s diplomatic importance, with the issue of sovereignty 
at its center. As Figure 1 shows, there are at least five claimants to the features in the SCS: 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and China. What is often overlooked is 
Taiwan’s claim, independent from China’s. Near the center of the Spratly Islands, Taiwan 
claims and occupies one of the largest features, Itu Aba. The largest claim in Figure 1 is 
the Nine Dash Line, China’s claim to the SCS. As Saunders and Bowie note, individual 
sovereignty causes disputants to “battle over the EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] rights, 
extraction of resources, and law enforcement.”21 Since China’s claim encompasses the 
entire SCS, sovereignty matters create diplomatic tension with other claimants. Bill Hayton 
explains that “recognised [sic] possession of an island gives the owner rights to the sea, to 
the fish swimming around it and to the minerals that may lie on or below the seabed. More 
recently, possession has come to mean much more. For some, it has become the difference 
between pride and humiliation.”22  
The second category is the SCS’s unique economic importance, which is due to two 
factors: a major SLOC runs through it and vast amounts of natural resources lie under the 
seabed. According to David Feith, nearly $5 trillion worth of trade passes through the SCS 
annually.23 This number includes 80 percent of China’s oil imports as estimated in Taylor 
Fravel’s article “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea.”24 
In addition to the amount of trade shipped through the SCS, the area is abundant 
with natural resources, including fisheries, natural gas, and oil. In a 2018 article, the United 
 
21 Saunders and Bowie, “US–China Military Relations: Competition and Cooperation in the Obama 
and Trump Eras,” 72. 
22 Hayton, The South China Sea, xiii. 
23 David Feith, “China’s Next Sea Fortress; A Triangle of Outposts in the South China Sea could Give 
Beijing Control Over Major Shipping Lanes and a Military Launchpad into the Pacific,” Wall Street 
Journal (Online), August 3, 2015, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1700775991?accountid=12702. 
24 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, No. 
3 (2011): 296. 
9 
States Energy Information Administration reported “11 billion barrels of oil and 190 
trillion cubic feet of gas lie within the seabed of the South China Sea.”25  
The third category, perhaps the most evident and concerning aspect, is the South 
China Sea’s military importance. As China demonstrated, the features in the SCS can 
become islands built upon reefs and those islands can support airfields, troop infrastructure, 
an array of radars, and missiles of any type. As Saunders and Bowie suggest, “militarization 
is a useful mechanism for subduing the opponents, especially from a position of 
strength.”26 Whereas all claimants are equal in their desire for sovereignty and resources, 
China is militarily out of reach with its “HQ-9B surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs), YJ-12B 
anti-cruise ballistic missiles (ACBMs), and electronic jamming equipment.”27  With these 
advanced weapons, Heydarian continues that “many believe that it’s just a matter of time 
before the Asian powerhouse establishes, or tries to establish, an exclusion zone in the 
area.”28 These islands provide a significant power projection opportunity for any nation, 
but China is well ahead of any other claimants.  
3. Sea Control in the South China Sea 
The concept of sea assurance stems from command of the sea; however, instead of 
wartime control of a body of water, sea assurance refers to peacetime establishment of anti-
ship capabilities outside a country’s recognized territory. Because sea assurance is a new 
concept, the relevant literature largely regards command of the sea generally and China’s 
efforts to obtain it.  
 
25 Angaindrankumar Gnanasagaran, “Is Joint Exploration the Answer to the South China Sea 
Dispute?” The Asean Post, March 25, 2018, https://theaseanpost.com/article/joint-exploration-answer-
south-china-sea-dispute.  
26 Saunders and Bowie, “US–China Military Relations: Competition and Cooperation in the Obama 
and Trump Eras,” 73. 
27 Heydarian, The Indo-Pacific, 151–152.  
28 Heydarian, 152. 
10 
The concept of command of the sea was first introduced by Alfred Thayer Mahan 
in his The Influence of Sea Power Upon History.29 In a 2003 article, Barry Posen refers to 
command of the sea as a necessary element of United States hegemony and claims, 
“command means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the sea, space, 
and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to deny their use to others; and that 
others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the 
United States.”30  
There is little academic scholarship that directly addresses this concept with 
China’s military reform efforts in the last two decades, but Toshi Yoshihara and James 
Holmes, prominent scholars of Chinese command of the sea, directly evaluate this link in 
their 2005 article “Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics.” In this article, they 
refer to China’s fourth Defense White Paper (2004) as a distinct shift in China’s military 
aims by stating, “the paper calls for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to craft military 
forces capable of ‘winning both command of the sea and command of the air.’ This is the 
first mention of command of the ‘commons’—the seas, skies, and space—in an official 
directive, bespeaking Beijing’s new, more assertive and outward-looking attitude toward 
China’s strategic environment.”31  
In response to China’s significant military reforms in the early 2000s and 2010s, 
Yoshihara and Holmes provided warnings to the United States. In their article, 
“Responding to China’s Rising Sea Power,” they claim that China may soon be able to 
hold control of all merchant movement through the SCS and “freedom of the sea would 
exist no more.”32 In their “Deterring China in the ‘Gray Zone’: Lessons of the SCS for 
United States Alliances,” they cite China’s use of bolstered maritime law enforcement 
force to create a “virtually resistance-free environment in which to pursue its strategic 
 
29 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power, 11. 
30 Posen, “Command of the Commons,” 8. 
31 Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics,” Orbis 
49, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 678, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2005.07.008. 
32 Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Responding to China’s Rising Sea Power,” Orbis 61, no. 1 
(2017): 94, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2016.12.009. 
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aims.” Essentially, by bolstering its naval forces and militarizing the Spratly Islands, China 
appears to have drastically improved its position on the spectrum of command of the sea 
as it pertains to the SCS.  
Most of the existing literature on the SCS shares one limitation for the purposes of 
this thesis: it was written before China deployed anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles on 
Spratly outposts. For example, Michael Beckley wrote that China has “little hope of 
establishing sea control anywhere in the southern portions of the South China Sea,” and in 
a conflict near Malaysia or Indonesia, “China’s navy would have to transit several days 
each way between the combat theater and China’s naval base on Hainan.”33 In fact, China’s 
missiles on the Spratly Islands cover most of the south portion of the SCS in addition to 
providing port facilities to the Chinese Navy (eliminating a transit from Hainan). Since 
Beckley’s book was published in September 2018, it is unclear if he was aware of the extent 
of Spratly militarization or found it insignificant. This research explores the impact of 
Spratly militarization to include missile systems and port facilities.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In evaluating China’s level of sea assurance in the SCS by militarizing the Spratlys 
and the subsequent effects on GPC in a DIME framework, three hypotheses are possible. 
First, the most likely result of Spratly militarization is that China achieved sea assurance 
in the SCS that greatly benefited China in every DIME category of GPC. Evidence for this 
hypothesis would require reasonable demonstration of China’s ability to control the SCS 
along with clear, beneficial changes to its diplomatic relationships, information capability, 
military capability, and economic situation.  
A second hypothesis is that Spratly militarization aided China’s effort of sea 
assurance but largely impacted only the military and economic aspects of GPC. This 
hypothesis would require demonstration that China is potentially on course for sea 
assurance in the SCS but lacks full control and would need a number of other developments 
for sea assurance. This hypothesis would also suggest that Spratly militarization mostly 
 
33 Beckley, Unrivaled, 92. 
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benefited China militarily and economically with little to no impact on China’s diplomatic 
standing or informational capabilities.  
A third hypothesis is that Spratly militarization does not significantly impact 
China’s sea assurance and is only of military benefit in a wartime scenario. This hypothesis 
would likely result from significant evidence of China’s defensive intent, with little 
expectation of Spratly militarization being used for control of the surrounding water 
outside of full-on war and no measurable effect on China’s economic ventures.  
Finally, additional evidence may reveal alternative hypotheses that unexpectedly 
combine factors of the aforementioned hypotheses. For instance, perhaps China achieved 
demonstrable sea assurance by militarizing the Spratlys and did not measurably benefit in 
any category of DIME. Or, for example, China has no control over the SCS but Spratly 
militarization benefited its diplomatic position with ASEAN, etc.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research first analyzes United States-China competition in the categories of 
DIME before and after Spratly militarization. By comparing Spratly-relevant DIME 
changes over time, this research discerns how Spratly militarization impacted United 
States-China competition. In areas where Spratly militarization had no measurable effect, 
this research evaluates what conditions determined its lack of significance.  
In addition to the primary academics previously discussed, this research uses 
credible press reports, data from the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) Asia Maritime Transparency 
Initiative (AMTI), unclassified maritime traffic sources, defense studies, and diplomatic 
statements. These sources are best suited for an all-source approach to defining GPC within 
DIME categories and their changes over time.  
To evaluate diplomatic aspects, this research analyzes China’s diplomatic relations 
before and after Spratly militarization using academic assessments and quantifiable 
measures. Specifically, this research uses ideal point as a metric of diplomatic support. To 
evaluate information aspects, this research uses technical measurements of China’s 
13 
capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and counter-ISR 
developed from Spratly militarization. To evaluate military aspects, this research uses 
academic and defense analyst assessments of China’s military capabilities developed from 
Spratly militarization. To evaluate economic aspects, this research uses WTO data, 
maritime traffic data, and analyst assessments of potential indicators related to Spratly 
militarization.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis includes five chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter II provides 
a background and context of the situation, including a relevant history of the GPC, the SCS, 
and maritime strategy concepts. Chapter III discusses Chinese militarization of the Spratly 
Islands—the physical buildup of the islands and subsequent military improvements and the 
effect of Spratly militarization on GPC within the DIME framework. Chapter IV explains 
sea assurance and analyzes how Spratly militarization impacted China’s level of sea 
assurance in the SCS. Chapter V concludes with the findings of this research, its 
implications for United States policy, and recommendations for future research.  
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II. COMPETITION, SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND SEA CONTROL 
As described in Chapter I, this thesis finds that China’s militarization of the South 
China Sea impacted United States-China competition primarily in the information and 
military categories of DIME. To frame the analysis and arguments of following chapters, 
this chapter provides the background of three important elements: United States-China 
competition, the SCS, and command of the sea. Moving from broad to specific, this chapter 
first provides a brief overview of United States-China competition within GPC. Once the 
global stage is set, this chapter provides background on the maritime domain enveloping 
the Spratly Islands, the SCS, by discussing its history and broader significance. Finally, the 
last section discusses the Mahanian concept of command of the sea, its development, and 
current subcategories.  
A. UNITED STATES-CHINA COMPETITION 
Great power competition is an underlying concern for much of United States policy. 
The April 2021 Annual Threat Assessment from the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence states that the United States will face a “diverse array of threats” against the 
“backdrop of great power competition.”34 In a report to Congress, Ronald O’Rourke 
argues that renewed GPC has led “to a renewed emphasis on grand strategy and 
geopolitics,” which makes GPC “a starting point for discussing United States defense 
levels, strategy, plans, and programs.”35 The primary players of current GPC for the 
purposes of this thesis are the United State and China due to competing interests in Asia. 
Russia is generally included in discussions of GPC; however, Russia is of little or no 
relevance to the effect of China’s actions in the Spratly Islands. Thus, this thesis focuses 
on United States-China competition and evaluates how China’s actions in the Spratly 
 
34 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 9, 2021), 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2204-2021-
annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community. 
35 Ronald O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense – Issues for 
Congress, CRS Report No. R43838 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), 2, 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/download/R/R43838/R43838.pdf. 
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Islands impacted its overarching competition with the United States. Other areas of 
competition—South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, etc.—are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. This section briefly provides the historical perspective of GPC, notable causes of 
current GPC, and how Spratly militarization relates to contemporary GPC.  
Great power competition is not a new concept; similar jockeying for power was 
displayed by the nations of the ancient world. Major turning points in GPC were generally 
marked by conflict. In particular, Graham Allison directly compares modern day GPC with 
the circumstances leading to the Peloponnesian War in his article and subsequent book 
referring to the “Thucydides Trap.”36 Allison evaluates great power struggles since the 
Peloponnesian War and argues that power is a key factor in conflict between international 
rivals.37 For the purposes of this thesis, though, the current international system began after 
World War II.  
Following World War II, the United States and Russia became the primary players 
of GPC while China developed from extreme impoverishment to rising power. Though the 
Cold War was not without conflict (Korean War, Vietnam War, etc.), GPC did not result 
in a great power war—a potentially apocalyptic war, no less. Following economic decline, 
the Soviet Union fell in 1991.38 With China’s economic boom under Deng Xiaoping, the 
fall of the Soviet Union set the stage for the heir-apparent to GPC with the United States.  
When Russia ceased to be a significant threat to the United States, an economically 
rising China was still not quite a global power of concern.39 With the Cold War over and 
the United States still in a complicated but comfortable peace with China, GPC largely 
took a pause in the early 1990s. Some have called this time period the “unipolar 
 
36 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, 
September 24, 2015; Allison, Destined for War.  
37 Allison. 
38 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of 
Difference (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 435–436; William Daugherty, Executive Secrets 
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 189. 
39 Michael Fabey, Crashback: The Power Clash Between the U.S. and China in the Pacific (New 
York: Scribner, 2017), 62. 
17 
moment.”40 As a prelude to the Taiwan elections in 1996, China began live fire exercises 
near Taiwan as well as a planned amphibious assault exercise.41 The United States 
responded by sending two carrier strike groups to the Taiwan Strait. Though China was 
growing confident as a rising power, this incident was a humble reminder that China was 
not ready to challenge the United States on the global stage. China realized the strategy of 
“hide our capabilities and bide our time” set forth by Deng Xiaoping, would apply near its 
own coasts until it achieved military parity with the United States42 Throughout the late 
1990s and early 2000s, China focused its economic success into a vastly more capable 
military and, most notably, maritime defense.  
Why is GPC important today? The unipolar moment of United States hegemony 
began to decline around 2006 and ostensibly ended by 2014 with the relative strengthening 
of Russia and China.43  The United States then shifted forces and focus from conflicts in 
the Middle East to Asia. Acknowledged in the 2015 National Security Strategy and 
described as a “pivot” or “rebalance to Asia,” this shift largely began the current era of 
United States-China competition at the forefront of GPC.44   
B. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
Because it is at an intersection of economic, security, and sovereignty issues, the 
SCS is a unique microcosm of GPC. Great powers and their allies rely on the resources 
within and passing through the SCS, and because of these resources, seek security and 
 
40 O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition, 1. 
41 Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2011), 96–97. 
42 Friedberg, 142–145.  
43 O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition, 1.  
44 Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Rising Power, the U.S. Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for U.S.-
China Relations,” Issues & Studies 50, no. 3 (September 2014): 19.  
18 
sovereignty.45 This section briefly covers the history and important aspects of the SCS to 
contextualize the importance of activity in the Spratly Islands.  
1. Competitive History 
Countries around the SCS, particularly China and Vietnam, claim to have proof of 
sovereignty from hundreds, if not thousands, of years ago. Recent evidence starts in the 
early 1900s, when Chinese naval commander Li Zhun inspected various islands in the SCS. 
These inspections led to China forming a plan to develop the Paracel Islands in the north 
SCS.46 In the 1930s, France claimed sovereignty over the Paracels as the protectorate of 
Vietnam. Most activity during those times involved the economic benefits of fishing or 
guano collection in addition to sovereignty.  
Immediately after WWII, the United States and Allies debated what to do with 
Japan’s claimed islands in the SCS. Japan would lose its acquisitions, but it was not clear 
who rightfully claimed which islands. Unfortunately, the issue was left generally vague 
after the San Francisco Conference.47 In 1946, with the independence of the Philippines 
and China’s establishment of a fledgling navy, claimants began a rush for the islands. 
France attempted to keep as much of the Paracels and Spratlys as possible; China, then the 
Republic of China (ROC), marked Itu Aba; and the Philippines claimed the Spratlys.48 
China’s fundamental territorial claim was first made in a statement issued by Chinese 
premier Zhou Enlai in August 1951. In the statement, Zhou declared China’s sovereignty 
over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.49   
As the Vietnam War ended, Vietnam increased its focus on claims in the SCS. 
“Prior to 1975, Beijing and Hanoi engaged in no arguments about territory, including the 
 
45 The works of King C. Chen, Michael Fabey, Humphrey Hawksley, Richard Javad Heydarian, and 
Bill Hayton referenced in this thesis are a few of the many books dedicated to South China Sea issues.  
46 King C. Chen, China’s War With Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications (Stanford, 
California: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 44. 
47 Chen, 45. 
48 Hayton, The South China Sea, 58. 
49 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy,” 293. 
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Paracels and Spratlies [sic]…After 1974, however, the situation gradually developed into 
dispute.”50 In 1973, Vietnam occupied islands in the Paracels, harassed Chinese fishermen, 
and began drawing up contracts with foreign companies for oil exploration.51 In the same 
year, Vietnam announced the incorporations of eleven islands in the Spratlys into one of 
its districts; China responded by occupying the Paracel Islands after a brief conflict with 
Vietnam in January 1974.52 From 1974 to present day, China and Southeast Asian 
countries incrementally developed outposts and engaged in sporadic, low-level conflicts 
over fishing, oil, land reclamation, and/or development.53 For example, China forcibly 
seized features in the Paracel and Spratlys from Vietnam in 1974 and 1988 as well as 
Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012.54 
China and Vietnam hold the largest claims, and both are based on historic claims 
to sovereignty and occupation or inspection of various islands. The other claimants—
Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines—hold claims more in line with the United Nations’ 
definition of an Economic Exclusionary Zone (EEZ) as defined in the 1982 UN Convention 
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Figure 2. Disputed Claims in the SCS 56 
The key takeaway from Figure 2 is the many claims entangling the Spratly Islands. 
China’s claim to the Spratly Islands is part of its overarching claim to the SCS. In addition 
to sovereignty of the massive area, the claim affects numerous significant waterways—
internationally, passage from Singapore, Palawan passages, passage toward San 
Bernardino Strait, and Luzon Strait passage; regionally, the Gulf of Tonkin and Gulf of 
Thailand.  
The current state of claimed territories is the result of a surge of interest from all 
countries bordering the SCS following the UN establishment of EEZs. Without a formal 
negotiation between claimants or international arbitration to establish which feature 
belonged to which country, each claimant resorted to de facto occupation and fait accompli 
diplomacy. Examples of these methods include the Chinese seizure of Scarborough Shoal 
from the Philippines in 2012. Similarly, the Philippines established de facto control of 
Second Thomas Shoal by grounding a WWII-era amphibious ship on the feature.57 This 
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ship, the Sierra Madre, houses a complement of Filipino marines to ensure the feature does 
not change to other claimants. Thus, each country developed the features it occupied and 
increased defenses where they were able. China’s developments are, by far, the most 
militarily capable.  
2. Available and Prospective Resources 
The SCS is rich with natural resources, primarily fish, oil, and natural gas. Though 
other estimates are lower, China assesses the amount of oil around 125 billion barrels and 
natural gas at approximately 500 trillion cubic feet.58 The determination of EEZs by 
UNCLOS changed the previous game of first come, first served into a matter of economic 
sovereignty. To achieve international recognition of ownership of nearly all SCS resources, 
UNCLOS gave China a reason to attempt enforcing its claim over most of the SCS, the 
Nine Dash Line.59 In addition to oil, the SCS is one of “the earth’s most productive fishing 
zones” and provides about half of the fish eaten in China, the Philippines, and Vietnam.60 
Aside from natural resources, the SCS is economically important as a sea line of 
communication (SLOC). Approximately 80 percent of all trade is carried by sea, and about 
20–33 percent of global trade passes through the SCS.61 Based on a study conducted by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research in November 2020, if east-west trade through 
the SCS were halted, the economies of Taiwan and Singapore would contract by 20–30 
percent  and the economies of Hong Kong, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia would 
drop by 10–15 percent.62 China’s economy, on the other hand, would suffer a 0.7 percent 
loss because of its domestic markets and ports outside the SCS.63 China certainly conducts 
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a significant amount of trade through the SCS, but a conflict in the area would be an 
inconvenience to China and devastating to its neighbors.  
In addition to trade, the SCS SLOC is an important element of China’s larger 
economic ambitions vis-à-vis the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as One Belt 
One Road (OBOR). In total, BRI is a massive and complex infrastructure investment 
venture with over 130 countries and thousands of projects.64 China officially started BRI 
in 2013, between 2013 and 2020, invested nearly $800 billion in numerous sectors, mostly 
transport and energy.65 BRI is an independent factor of GPC as a major Chinese economic 
project. However, BRI is also related to the Spratly Islands because of BRI’s maritime 
focus and the “road” part of the Belt and Road Initiative: the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road (MSR).66  Somewhat counterintuitively, the road is a series of ports and coastal 
infrastructure to connect Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean.67 The 
MSR depends on stable (or at least Chinese-controlled) trade through the SCS.  
C. MARITIME STRATEGY: COMMAND OF THE SEA AND SEA DENIAL 
A shift in maritime strategy is at the core of China’s impact on GPC through Spratly 
militarization. To understand how China changed the norms of maritime strategy, this 
section explains its basic elements and evolution. Alfred Thayer Mahan described the key 
elements of maritime strategy. Those terms gave way to further evaluation and analysis of 
various aspects that contribute to modern analysis. In his iconic work Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History, Mahan coined the term “command of the sea” to describe how 
 
64 “BRI Projects,” Belt and Road Initiative website, accessed 10 November – 17 December 2020, 
https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/projects. 
65 American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Database (object name China Global Investment; accessed 
November 10 – December 17, 2020), https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker; Nadège 
Rolland, “China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?,” The Washington 
Quarterly 40, no. 1 (April 2017): 127, DOI:10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302743.  
66 William A. Callahan, “China’s ‘Asia Dream’: The Belt Road Initiative and the New Regional 
Order,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1 (2016): 236–237. 
67 Callahan, 236. 
23 
seafaring nations thought about and achieved power in the maritime domain.68 Generally, 
Mahan defined “command of the sea” and “sea power” as a nation’s ability to ensure 
maneuver of its naval and commercial vessels in the maritime domain while limiting an 
adversary’s ability to maneuver in that domain.69 This broad definition lacks nuance and 
is rarely applicable in the modern maritime environment. Using Mahan’s concepts and 
terminology, Geoffrey Till observed that Mahan did not provide explicit definitions of the 
terms he put forth (sea power/seapower and command of the sea).70 As Milan Vego, 
another maritime strategist, suggests, “the concept of command or control of the sea has 
undergone numerous changes in the course of the history of naval warfare.”71 Both Till 
and Vego provided specificity to the broad Mahanian concepts of sea control and sea 
denial.  
The first major component of command of the sea is sea control. In his book 
Maritime Strategy and Sea Control, Vego provides a basic definition of sea control as the 
“ability of combatants to enjoy naval dominance.”72 Till expands on this dominance as 
“the capacity to control the sea to the extent they need to in order to do what they feel they 
have to at and from the sea, whether that be to protect their offshore estate, their sea lines 
of communication or their territory from attack, or to threaten someone else’s.”73 
Similarly, maritime strategist, Barry Posen, elaborates on “command” as getting “vastly 
more military use out of the sea, space, and air than do others” and being able to “credibly 
threaten to deny their use to others.”74 These strategists highlight the key aspects of sea 
control: using the sea for one’s purposes while preventing enemy usage. Given this general 
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concept of sea control, the level of control can be further specified depending on two 
adversaries’ respective ability to operate.  
Till elaborated on the command of the sea concept by providing levels of sea 
control based on a nation’s ability to freely operate.75 Till equated Mahan’s “command of 
the sea” with what he calls “absolute sea control.”76 Though Till provided levels, these are 
theoretical instead of practical; it is a practical impossibility for any nation to achieve 
absolute sea control. Instead, sea control is a continuously shifting state of play between 
forces in conflict. Sea control requires both one’s ability to utilize a body of water, but also 
the prevention of enemy use in the same area. In comparing sea control vs. sea denial, Vego 
states, “obtaining or gaining sea control is a positive object while denying that control is a 
negative object.”77 For the purposes of this thesis, sea denial is the most important element. 
Sea denial is an essential element of sea control. China’s militarization of the Spratly 
Islands is a form of preemptive sea denial or, as this thesis proposes, it is the establishment 
of sea assurance, discussed at length in Chapter IV. Vego also says that sea denial can be 
described as “preventing partially or completely the enemy’s use of the sea for military and 
commercial purposes.”78 China’s use of the Spratly Islands to achieve preemptive sea 
denial (sea assurance) is the focus of the analysis provided in Chapter IV.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined GPC as a key factor in both Chinese and United States 
decision making. In militarizing the Spratly Islands, China impacted GPC in several 
categories. The primary impact of that militarization is through a new aspect of maritime 
strategy that changed the nature and dynamics of the SCS. The importance of the Spratly 
Islands and the multi-faceted impacts of their militarization also effected economic, 
diplomatic, and security issues. The next chapter discusses each of the impacts individually 
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and argues each category of effect influences other categories to form the overall change 
to GPC from Spratly militarization. This overarching change is understandable as a new 
evolution of maritime strategy—from command of the sea to control/denial, and, finally, a 
peacetime variant called sea assurance.  
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III. CHINA SPRATLY MILITARIZATION AND IMPACT 
ON UNITED STATES-CHINA COMPETITION 
To understand the importance of sea assurance and its relevance to maritime 
strategy, this chapter analyzes China’s Spratly militarization and its impact on U.S-China 
competition. To measure such a broad topic as China-United States competition, this 
research uses the DIME framework and measures effects as either beneficial, harmful, or 
neutral to the United States and/or China. This chapter proceeds in three sections. The first 
section provides a more focused background on Spratly development. The second section 
evaluates the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) impact of Spratly 
militarization. The concluding section provides an overall analysis of the impact of Spratly 
militarization. 
Why does this thesis use DIME as the framework? As alluded to in Chapter II, GPC 
has been an overarching condition of international relations since the beginning of human 
state-making. Such competition is impacted by every aspect of societal interaction, and 
those interactions evolve over time. To analyze and understand changes in these numerous 
exchanges, it is necessary to define major categories of potential impact. Diplomacy, 
information, military, and economics broadly capture many perceivable interactions. The 
DIME framework is one often used by military analysts, decision makers, and academics. 
Using the categories of the DIME framework allows for more useful evaluation of the 
overall impact of Spratly militarization on GPC. 
A. MILITARIZATION BACKGROUND 
This section provides specifics on how China developed its claimed features in the 
Spratlys. First, this section explains the transformation of underwater features into usable 
bases. Next, it explains the military equipment China built on the new features.  
1.  Physical Buildup of the Spratly Islands 
Before being able to build airfields on Spratly outposts, China was faced with the 
task of turning underwater features into usable land. One could argue that the creation of 
the islands was the event of militarization; however, the islands could only be effectively 
28 
utilized for military purposes once airfields were complete. Figure 3 shows dredging 
operations at Fiery Cross and is a good representation of what dredging operations looked 
like on all features.  
 
 
Figure 3. Fiery Cross Reef Dredging, 2014 (left and center) to 2015 (right)79 
As the result of dredging operations in 2014 and 2015, China created seven new 
islands.80 As depicted in Figure 3, the features of the Spratly Islands were mostly 
underwater at high tide; China used multiple dredgers to move sand up to create dry land. 
Johnson Reef, a smaller feature near the center of the Spratly Islands, was the first new 
feature dredged in January 2014.81 Hughes Reef, near the center of the Spratly Islands, and 
Cuarteron Reef, the southernmost feature, were dredged starting in March 2014.82 Fiery 
Cross Reef and Gaven Reef, also near the center of the Spratly Islands, were dredged 
beginning in August of 2014.83  The last two to begin dredging operations were Mischief 
and Subi Reefs in March 2015.84 This physical buildup allowed the installation of 
infrastructure in subsequent months and, ultimately, military equipment and infrastructure. 
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This construction formed what former INDOPACOM commander, retired Admiral Harry 
Harris, called a “Great Wall of Sand” in a March 2015 speech.85 
2. Military Buildup of the Spratly Islands 
The physical creation of the islands in 2014 was the beginning of China’s plan, but 
China’s intention to militarize the islands was denied by Xi Jinping and not globally 
realized until 2016. As stated by The Maritime Executive, “in 2015, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping pledged that China had no intention of militarizing its bases in the SCS. However, 
in December 2016, satellite imagery showed air defense weaponry installed on several of 
the Chinese-controlled islands.”86 The three areas of the Spratly outpost militarization are: 
airfields, information warfare systems, and missiles.  
The first area of militarization is airfields. China currently operates airfields on 
three outposts—Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs. China was not the first to construct 
airfields on the Spratly Islands, but its airstrips are nearly three times larger than the other 
claimants and the only airstrips capable of full-scale military operations.87 Satellite 
imagery first revealed complete airfields on the three outposts in late 2015 and 2016. Fiery 
Cross appeared operational in September 2015; Mischief and Subi appeared operational in 
mid-late 2016.88  
The second area of militarization is ISR and CISR systems. China installed radar 
systems on all outposts as well as jamming equipment on the three major outposts in early 
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2018.89 As with most electronic devices, jamming equipment ranges in size; the exact type 
or amount of jamming equipment is not available in unclassified literature. Unlike airfields, 
jamming equipment is highly mobile and not easily observable.  
The third area of militarization is missiles. The most glaring militarization of the 
Spratly Islands was China’s placement of missiles on the three major outposts. By May 
2018, China deployed anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) 
on Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs.90 The deployment was somewhat expected due 
to the previous construction of missile shelters in the summer of 2017.91 Despite Xi 
Jinping’s suggestions otherwise, the movement of missiles to the Spratly Islands clearly 
signaled China’s intent to militarize the area. In militarizing the Spratly Islands, China 
developed a wide range of new capabilities approximately 500 nautical miles (NM) away 
from its mainland. To protect the outposts from attack, all seven outposts were also 
equipped with multiple close-in weapons systems (CIWS).92 These improvements and 
respective capabilities are discussed in greater detail in Section B (Subsections 2 and 3) of 
this chapter.  
B. EFFECT OF SPRATLY MILITARIZATION ON U.S.-CHINA 
COMPETITION  
As stated by China’s State Council Information Office, the Spratlys are a focal point 
of GPC between the United States and China.93 Before China placed missiles on the 
outposts, a study for Congress suggested, “the home to one-third of all global maritime 
 
89 Michael Gordon, “China Installed Military Jamming Equipment on Spratly Islands, U.S. Says,” 
Dow Jones Institutional News (New York), April 9, 2018. 
90 Amanda Macias, “China Quietly Installed Missile Systems on Strategic Spratly Islands in Hotly 
Contested South China Sea,” CNBC, May 2, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/02/china-added-
missile-systems-on-spratly-islands-in-south-china-sea.html. 
91 Wyatt Olson, “China Steps Closer to Military Dominance in South China Sea with Missile Shelters, 
Hangars,” TCA Regional News (Chicago), June 29, 2017, 1.  
92 AMTI/CSIS, (object name Spratly Island Defenses, accessed April 15, 2020 – June 1, 2021), 
https://amti.csis.org/chinas-new-spratly-island-defenses. 
93 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense 
in the New Era (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, July 2019), 6.  
31 
traffic ‘will be virtually a Chinese lake’ by 2030.”94 Though some defense analysts were 
concerned with the militarization, others were concerned with the lack of American alarm; 
“Beijing is betting that American leaders and voters won’t appreciate the military, 
diplomatic and economic stakes in the conflict…Americans still dismiss China’s maritime 
conquests as mere scuffles over ‘a bunch of rocks.’”95 Former United States Pacific Fleet 
commander, Admiral Scott Swift (retired), states that “the strategic significance of [China-
United States] competition… [is that] freedom of navigation is being impeded in the 
diplomatic domain, the information domain, yes, the military domain, [and] the economic 
domain.”96 This section reviews the impact of Chinese militarization of the Spratly Islands 
in terms of the effect it has had on the four domains of DIME.  
1. Diplomatic Effects 
To analyze the diplomatic effect of China’s Spratly militarization, this thesis uses 
“ideal point” analysis based on United Nations (UN) voting records.97 Ideal point analysis 
is based on the idea that how a country votes in UN decisions can be viewed as diplomatic 
movement if one country changes its voting pattern to be more like China. This analysis, 
conducted by Erik Voeten, reduces a country’s hundreds of annual votes to a number on 
an ideological scale for that year.98 By comparing two countries’ ideal points from voting 
data, one can surmise potential ideological alignment. The figures provided show the 
countries compared to China and the United States. The United States and China regularly 
occupy different areas of the ideological spectrum. If a country displays a significant shift 
in ideal point from China toward the United States immediately following 2014, it could 
represent a noteworthy diplomatic effect from Spratly militarization.  
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Based on ideal point analysis, some claimant countries drifted away from China, 
but none moved toward the United States Essentially, though public and private statements 
reflected anger toward China’s actions, these sentiments were not reflected in official 
support of either the United States or China in UN voting patterns. In evaluating public 
statements and expert analysis, claimant countries felt threatened by China’s militarization 
of the Spratlys and were underwhelmed by the lack of forceful United States response. As 
Heydarian states, “Washington sought to maintain an ‘impossible trinity,’ whereby it 
claimed neutrality on the South China Sea disputes, while simultaneously developing 
closer strategic ties with China as well as upgrading partnership and alliances with rival 
claimant states such as the Philippines (treaty ally), Taiwan (de facto ally), and Vietnam 
(strategic partner).”99 There is no evidence that Russia and East Asian countries were 
concerned enough about Spratly militarization to trigger a diplomatic reaction.  
China’s militarization of the Spratly Islands is one aspect of what the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense reported as China’s “coercive approach.”100 Because of this 
approach, Ketian Zhang describes China as a “cautious bully” in characterizing China’s 
penchant for exerting influence below of the line of conflict.101 As part of her argument, 
Zhang argues that China uses “grey-zone coercion” (both military and nonmilitary actions) 
to influence the behavior of other countries.102 Perhaps demonstrating the success of such 
an approach, the other SCS claimants responded to Spratly militarization with harsh 
rhetoric and calls for United States intervention, but no real shift in diplomatic activity.  
a. East Asian Impact 
China’s East Asian neighbors are not claimants to the Spratly Islands; however, the 
militarization of the SCS potentially allows China to control maritime movement in a major 
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SLOC. The creation and militarization of outposts establishes two dangerous scenarios for 
the rest of East Asia. The first scenario is China potentially restricting or limiting trade 
through the SCS, through which approximately five trillion dollars passes annually.103 
China would not likely stop its trade outright since Japan and South Korea are two of 
China’s primary trade partners. However, Spratly militarization gives China the physical 
capability to regulate the major trade routes through the SCS—including the Strait of 
Malacca, near Palawan, the San Bernardino Strait, or the Luzon Strait.104  
The second scenario is China using similar tactics in its disputes with East Asian 
countries. As David Feith states, “China’s preferred principle is might makes right,” and if 
the United States is unable to deter China in the SCS, China could undo decades of 
“stability in East Asia.”105 China ignoring arbitration of territorial claims and, instead, 
seizing, creating, and militarizing disputed areas sets a dangerous precedent settling other 
disputes in its proximity—Scarborough Reef, the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, 
fishing rights in the Yellow Sea, or Taiwan autonomy (on Itu Aba or at home). Japan would 
likely display a much greater reaction if China took military action at the Senkaku 
Islands.106 Similarly, South Korea would likely react to Chinese action near its coast in the 
Yellow Sea. Taiwan’s concerns for seizing claimed territory are more existential than 
South Korea or Japan.  
Based on these scenarios, one might expect to see clear diplomatic backlash against 
China, however, the quantifiable data suggests no change at all. As depicted in Figure 4, 
neither Japan nor South Korea displayed a significant shift in ideal point after the 
militarization of the Spratlys in 2015.  
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Figure 4. Ideal Points of United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan107 
Judging the relative distance between China (orange), South Korea (yellow), 
Taiwan (light blue) compared to the United States (dark blue), South Korea and Taiwan 
shifted slightly toward the United States in 2016. However, since the shift was less than 
half a point and within half a point of South Korea and Taiwan’s average ideal points since 
2012, it does not suggest a significant diplomatic change due to China’s Spratly 
militarization. The same is true of Japan (grey) as it displayed almost no shift whatsoever 
after 2015. The lack of diplomatic change after Spratly militarization is potentially because 
China’s East Asian neighbors were not directly threatened by Spratly militarization as the 
other claimants of the Spratlys. 
b. Southeast Asian Impact 
The countries more immediately threatened by militarization of the Spratlys are 
Southeast Asian nations, specifically the other Spratly claimants—the Philippines, 
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Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam. Their economic concerns are similar to East Asian 
countries—China’s ability to impact trade and precedence of unilateral action. The latter 
was proven at Scarborough Reef in 2012.108 As a benefit of its coercive approach, China’s 
Spratly militarization established de facto control over disputed features and the 
surrounding waters; this action prevented other claimants from the “friendly consultations 
and negotiations” China promised them in 2002.109  As quoted by Fravel and Miura, Zuo 
Xiyin suggests, “land reclamation has created a ‘new normal’ in which China now has 
greater bargaining leverage in its disputes ‘due to dramatic changes in its actual control of 
the area.’”110 As for rhetorical responses, claimants diplomatically responded in two 
general ways: blatantly opposed to China’s actions or no clear response. Vietnam and the 
Philippines opposed China’s actions, but Malaysia and Brunei remained relatively quiet 
about China’s actions.  
The Philippines’ reaction to Spratly militarization was in concert with its existing 
disputes with China. China used the auspices of fisheries protection to seize Scarborough 
from the Philippines, which caused the Philippines to file a case against China with the 
Hague in 2013.111 This demonstrated China’s willingness to abuse Southeast Asian 
countries for its own benefit. The seizure of Scarborough also weakened the Philippines’ 
trust in the United States to back Southeast Asian nations. In 2016, after China’s 
militarization of the Spratlys, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against China’s 
claims in the SCS, but China did not accept the ruling.112 Via President Rodrigo Duterte, 
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the Philippines diplomatic reaction was rhetorical and ambiguous. As Michael Beckley 
states, “Duterte has repeatedly threatened to downgrade the United States-Filipino alliance, 
but he also has authorized the United States to upgrade its military facilities in the 
Philippines… instructed Filipino troops to ‘fight to the death’ to defend these islands 
against China, and threatened … to ride out to other Chinese-claimed features on his jet ski 
and plant Philippine flags on them too.”113 Other examples of Philippines’ ambiguity 
include its 2018 cooperative initiatives with China and simultaneous efforts to “develop 
maritime-defense capabilities.”114 As of April 2021, the Philippines recently lodged two 
diplomatic complaints against China from two events: in February 2020, China aimed a 
weapon system toward a Philippine corvette and, in March 2021, China stationed 
approximately 200 hundred People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) vessels at 
a Philippine-claimed Spratly feature, Whitsun Reef.115 The latter event harkens to China’s 
seizure of the Paracels from Vietnam in 1974, China’s seizure of Mischief Reef in 1994, 
and China’s seizure of Scarborough Reef in 2012.116   
While the Philippines and Vietnam are  “at the forefront of a maritime dispute with 
China in the South China Sea” according to Renato Cruz de Castro, Vietnam’s clash with 
China is distinct from that of the Philippines.117 Of all the claimants, Vietnam’s history of 
struggling with China for SCS features is the bloodiest, largely due to the 64 men killed by 
Chinese machine guns in the battle for Johnson Reef in 1988.118 A decade earlier, China 
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violently seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam.119 Vietnamese leadership was not as 
vocal as President Duterte but demonstrated its concern with China’s actions by increasing 
joint exercises with the United States and challenging China’s claims to hydrocarbon 
within the Vietnamese EEZ.120 An AMTI report in February 2021 revealed Vietnam was 
also increasing defenses at Spratly outposts West Reef and Sin Cowe Island.121 
In contrast to the Philippines and Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei were “less critical 
and more inclined to downplay” China’s actions.122 Both Brunei and Malaysia potentially 
prioritized their economic relationship with China over their territorial claims in the Spratly 
Islands.123 Despite the apparent degradation in diplomatic relations with the Philippines 
and Vietnam, ideal point analysis showed Southeast Asian claimants did not significantly 
respond via UN voting patterns. As depicted in Figure 5, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Brunei maintained approximately the same relative ideal point before and 
after Spratly militarization. This lack of significant shift suggests Spratly militarization was 
not enough of a problem to change the UN voting patterns of the Southeast Asian claimants 
to align with the United States more closely.  
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Figure 5. Ideal Points of United States, China, and Southeast Asian 
Claimants124 
Overall, China’s Spratly militarization (and United States response) resulted in no 
significant diplomatic change with East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. Despite 
potential trade impacts to East Asian countries and clear rhetorical irritation from Southeast 
Asian countries, ideal point analysis showed a neutral reaction. 
2.  Information Effects 
To evaluate the change of information effects as a result of Spratly militarization, 
this thesis uses Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and counter-ISR (CISR). Legal and 
psychological effects could also be argued under the category of information, but as 
previously discussed, those topics more aptly apply to the diplomatic changes of Spratly 
militarization. Spratly militarization primarily affected China-United States competition in 
three ways. First, radars and aircraft drastically increased China’s ability to detect and track 
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maritime forces in the SCS. Second, communications equipment increased China’s ability 
to conduct command and control (C2) in the Spratlys. Third, China gained the ability to 
restrict adversary ISR via jamming equipment.  
a. Detect and Track Maritime Forces 
One of the first improvements to the Spratly outposts was radar; China has put in 
place approximately 40 total radar installations.125 Figure 6 shows China’s radar coverage 
of the SCS before 2014 and after completion of militarization in 2015. The numerical 
change in coverage (based on optimal atmospheric conditions) is approximately 1,000 
square nautical miles in 2014 to approximately 150,000 square nautical miles by the end 
of 2015, an increase of 150 times the previous radar coverage.126  Of note, in addition to 
the “Big Three” outposts, four additional outposts were equipped with radars, perhaps 
suggesting more improvements are to follow on those outposts.127  
 
125 Alexander Neill and Meia Nouens, “China’s Radar Installations in the Spratly Islands – What do 
They Tell us About Its Ambitions for the South China Sea?” International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), February 19, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/02/china-radar.  
126 Adapted from Neill, Nouens, and Google Earth Pro. 
127 Neill and Nouens, “China’s Radar Installations.” 
40 
  
Figure 6. SCS Radar Coverage before (left) and after (right) 
Militarization128 
In addition to ground-based radars, the airfields on the Big Three outposts provide 
China with the capability to conduct airborne ISR. China’s primary ISR aircraft is the Y-8 
with an approximate range between 700 and 3,000 nautical miles depending on payload.129 
The new version of the Y-8 is the Y-9 with a range between 1,300 and 2,100 nautical 
miles.130 To account for variation between aircraft type and payload, Figure 7 uses 1,000 
nautical miles for ISR coverage range (500 NM out and 500 NM back).  
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Figure 7. SCS Airborne ISR Coverage before (left) and after (right) 
Militarization 131 
ISR aircraft from Woody Island allow China to detect and track maritime forces in 
most of the SCS, but the airfields on the Big Three outposts extend Chinese airborne-ISR 
coverage into the Sulu and Celebes Seas and beyond the SCS toward Thailand and 
Singapore. The port facilities available at the Big Three also allow military vessels and 
PAFMM, with a typical range of 3,000 to 5,000 NM, to resupply and conduct limited 
repairs in the Spratly Islands instead of traveling nearly 500 NM to Hainan Island.132 
Though these vessels have a military function (and economic, for PAFMM), their radars 
also allow them to act as tactical ISR assets.  
b. C2 and EW in the Spratlys 
In addition to information collection via ISR platforms, the militarization of the 
Spratly Islands provided China with new communication and jamming capabilities. 
Through satellite communication equipment, the Spratly outposts gained the ability to 
conduct C2 of PLA(N), CCG, and PAFMM either from the outposts or mainland China 
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(Southern Theater Command or Strategic Support Force).133 These communication 
outposts also provided greater access to China’s Beidou Satellite Navigation system and 
potential guidance to strategic missiles (DF-21D or DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles).134 
By 2018, China reportedly installed jamming equipment on the Spratly outposts.135 
Though exact ranges are difficult to identify, jamming equipment provided a  CISR 
capability, potentially against air, ship, or space information gatherers.136  
The overall information impact is significant. Radars provide the ability to detect 
and track vessels in and around the Spratly Islands. Communication outposts allow for 
enhanced C2 in the Spratlys. Airfields drastically extend airborne-ISR capability, and 
jamming equipment allows China to disrupt adversary information capabilities.  
3.  Military Effects 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most significant change to China-United States 
competition from China’s Spratly militarization is in the military category. The overall 
military result has been a significant increase in China’s missile coverage in the SCS. This 
missile coverage benefits China both as power projection and preparation/prevention of 
major conflict. Fravel states, “China hopes to create a boundary around its continental and 
maritime periphery that will increase the cost for other states to conduct military operations 
against targets on the mainland.”137 In addition to allowing China to project its own power 
several hundred miles farther, Spratly militarization also limits the United States from 
projecting power “near and into Chinese territory.”138 As with information capability, 
China enhanced its military capability using three domains: air, ground and sea.  
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a.  Airborne Capabilities  
Shortly after physically creating the features from dredged sand, China constructed 
operational airfields with 10,000-foot airstrips. This length is significant because it allows 
operations of larger aircraft—namely, bombers. These outposts have been compared to 
“stationary aircraft carriers,” however, each outpost is more than ten times wider and ten 
times longer than China’s current aircraft carriers.139 At that size, each outpost is able to 
store a large number of various aircraft in addition to the requisite repair facilities and 
logistics support. Figure 8 depicts the combat ranges of China’s primary anti-ship aircraft, 
the J-11B, JH-7, and H-6 bomber.140 
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Figure 8. SCS Airfield Ranges, before (above) and after (below) 
Militarization141 
As seen in Figure 8, China’s ability to project anti-ship capabilities before 2014 
were restricted to Woody Island or mainland China airbases. The addition of Spratly 
outposts expanded China’s anti-ship capability to include all of Borneo, the Java Sea, the 
Strait of Malacca, and Palau.142 In addition to an air-to-air function, the J-11B and can 
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carry YJ-91 anti-ship missiles, which have a range of 8 NM.143 The JH-7 can also carry 
theYJ-91 as well as the YJ-83K, which has a range of 97 NM.144 The PLA(N) H-6s are 
primarily for anti-ship missions and carry the YJ-83K as well as the YJ-12, which has a 
range of 270 NM.145 In short, before 2014, China could launch anti-ship capable aircraft 
from one base in the SCS, which could fly as far east as the Western Pacific via the Luzon 
Strait, as far south as the central Celebes Sea, and as far west as the Gulf of Thailand. After 
militarization, China gained the ability to launch aircraft from four bases in the SCS and 
engage enemy ships in the Indian Ocean, south of the Java Sea, and in the Western Pacific 
beyond Palau. As depicted in Figure 9, the length of the Spratly airfield runways is the 
prime difference between China and other claimants with developments.  
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Figure 9. Comparison of Airstrips in the SCS146 
Figure 9 shows China’s airstrips are significantly longer than other claimants and 
the only airstrips capable of supporting bombers. Each of China’s Big Three outposts have 
runways of this length, giving it a significant military advantage against other Spratly 
claimants and any country that may seek to militarily challenge China in the SCS. Short of 
conflict, China’s increased capability from Spratly airfields gives it the credible means to 
enforce an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) like the ADIZ it declared over the East 
China Sea in late 2013.147 These airfields also give China the capability to hold any naval 
vessel at risk long before the vessel enters the SCS.  
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b. Ground-based Capabilities 
Besides airfields, the Big Three outposts are equipped with missiles—both surface-
to-air (SAM) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). In 2018, China deployed HQ-9B 
SAMs to the Big Three outposts, enabling them to engage aircraft in nearly all the SCS and 
further support potential enforcement of an ADIZ over China’s claim of the Nine Dash 
Line.148 Figure 8 depicts the SAM coverage added in 2018 as well as a portion of China’s 
Nine Dash Line, what it claims as sovereign territory. Before 2018, China did not have 
SAMs on any outpost in the Spratly Islands.   
 
Figure 10. SCS SAM Coverage in the Spratly Islands149 
As depicted in Figure 10, the HQ-9 has a range of 54 NM.150 The Big Three SAMs 
do not extend to land and are mostly for defense of the outposts and their aircraft. Of note, 
 
148 Macias, “China Quietly Installed.” 
149 Source: “Airpower Projection.” 
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every other claimant with an airfield in the Spratlys is within missile range upon take off. 
These SAMs give China the ability to hold any aircraft in the Spratly Islands at risk without 
utilizing airborne platforms.  
In 2018, China also deployed the second type of ground-based system, YJ-12B 
ASCMs. These ASCMs enable China to engage surface vessels from the Sulu Sea to the 
coast of Vietnam.151 Before 2018, China did not have ground-based ASCMs in the Spratly 
Islands. The YJ-12B has a range of 270 NM; Figure 11 depicts their coverage of the Spratly 
Islands.  
 
Figure 11. Spratly ASCM Ranges152 
Of note, every vessel that travels through the SCS is within strike range of China’s 
ASCMs. As depicted in Figure 11, the YJ-12B systems on the Big Three outposts provide 
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overlapping ASCM coverage of most of the Spratly Islands. These missiles give China a 
dedicated anti-ship capability covering most of the SCS.  
c.  Seaborne Capabilities 
During their creation, the Spratly outposts were dredged to allow large vessels to 
dock and operate near the outposts. Additional infrastructure allows the repair and 
replenishment of military vessels as needed. These ports provide a significant logistic 
capability, enabling military vessels to operate farther from the mainland and closer to 
other claimants and potential conflicts. PLA(N), CCG, and PAFMM vessels potentially 
conducting coercion of other claimants or surveillance of United States vessels were 
previously required to return to mainland China. After Spratly militarization, the endurance 
of Chinese vessels increased by the availability of supplies at its Spratly outposts.  
Overall, the greatest impact to United States-China competition from Spratly 
militarization was the increase in China’s military capabilities. These added capabilities 
were gained from military-purpose airfields, advanced ASCMs, and SAM systems. 
Indirectly, the ports of these outposts logistically support naval operations several hundred 
miles away from mainland China.  
4. Economic Effects 
Considering the amount of money and effort put into militarization, one might 
expect China to benefit economically. Spratly militarization did not provide China with 
additional revenue such as tourism, and, based on World Trade Organization data and 
Harvard’s Atlas of Economic Complexity, China also did not experience a significant 
increase in relative trade or oil consumption compared to the other claimants.153 One 
interesting correlation with Spratly militarization was the significant increase in the number 
of Chinese merchant vessels. In 2018, the same year China put missiles on the Spratlys, 
the number of Chinese merchant vessels (including oil tankers and bulk carriers) increased 
from approximately 4,500 to nearly 6,000, quadruple the increase seen between 2016 and 
 
153 World Trade Organization Database (object name China, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, 
2013–2021; accessed April 2021), https://data.wto.org.  
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2017.154 Though there is no evidence of direct economic benefit, Spratly militarization 
provided China with indirect economic benefits in two ways: additional protection of its 
MSR and enhanced support to coercion of other claimants for natural resources in the SCS. 
a. Trade and BRI 
The Maritime Silk Road (MSR), depicted in Figure 10, is a sea route that starts 
“from southern Chinese provinces of Fujian through Southeast Asia, extending to South 
Asia and Western and North Africa then cutting through the Mediterranean to Europe.”155 
BRI infrastructure projects are the framework of BRI, but the maritime traffic is the 
lifeblood. China’s ability to control the SCS SLOCs directly affects its credibility with 
other countries involved. By militarizing the Spratlys, China took effective steps to control 
the major SLOCs in the SCS and tacitly fortify the MSR aspects of BRI.156 According to 
Heydarian, BRI is “above all, about laying the foundation of a ‘Chinese world order’” and 
its security is paramount.157 
 
154 UN Conference on Trade and Development (object name Maritime Profile: China; accessed April 
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Figure 12. The Maritime Silk Road in the SCS158 
 
158 Richard Ghiasy, Fei Su and Lora Saalman, The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: Security 
Implications and Wars Forward for the European Union, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), 2018, 18.  
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China’s MSR includes infrastructure improvement to ports shown in Figure 12, but 
the aspect affected by Spratly militarization is the SLOC. Figure 13 provides a depiction 
of maritime traffic through the SCS. In 2016, China was the top importer and exporter of 
trade through the SCS and imported 42 percent of the oil transiting in the SCS.159 Shown 
in the previous information and military sections, Spratly militarization nearly doubled 
China’s ISR and missile coverage of the SLOC. With ASCM coverage of the SLOC, China 
gained the ability to control major avenues of trade, protecting its own trade while 
potentially limited trade of other countries.160   
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Figure 13. SCS Maritime Traffic Density (2016)161 
Depicted in Figure 13, most maritime traffic in the SCS passes through the Strait 
of Malacca. As Bill Hayton suggests, “one of the reasons to build these big runways [in the 
Spratlys]…is to project power closer to the Malacca Strait…so it can protect trade routes 
that are coming from the Middle East and try and frustrate any theoretical plan by the 
United States to blockade the strait and starve China into submission.”162 The concept of 
Spratly militarization as a means to assure control the SCS SLOCs is discussed further in 
Chapter IV.  
 
161 Maritime Awareness Project. 
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b. Natural Resources 
As discussed in Chapter II, the SCS is rich in natural resources, specifically oil, 
natural gas, and fish. The militarization of the Spratly islands does not directly impact 
China’s ability to utilize these resources, but the placement of missile systems and added 
facilities increases China’s ability to monitor and coerce other claimants also utilizing 
resources in the area. As depicted in Figure 14, the Spratly Islands sit atop and near vast 
oil and gas reserves.  
 
Figure 14. SCS Oil and Gas Reserves163 
 
163 Maritime Awareness Project Database (object name Oil and Gas Reserves; accessed April 2021), 
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In 2014, China and Vietnam clashed over China’s oil rig, Haiyang Shiyou 981, 
within Vietnam’s claimed EEZ. The event involved “fishing crews and coast guards from 
both sides on dozens of boats and the sinking of a Vietnamese vessel.” 164 Because of 
Spratly militarization, if an event like the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 incident occurred near 
Vietnam’s southern coast, China would have significantly more firepower to persuade 
Vietnam from upholding its claim.  
In addition to oil rigs, China uses unilateral fishing bans over the SCS, that do not 
apply to Chinese vessels with official licenses.165 Because Vietnam and the Philippines do 
not want their acceptance of a ban to appear as recognition of China’s sovereignty in the 
SCS, these bans result in an “increasing number of clashes between fishermen from 
Vietnam and the Philippines sailing into the closed area and Chinese maritime authorities 
determined to enforce their regulations.”166 As mentioned, the PAFMM play a unique role 
in the SCS. This fishing fleet is composed of over 200,000 registered vessels that provide 
most of China’s fish and account for a third of global fish catch.167 The PAFMM are also 
able to continue fishing while the CCG enforces fishing bans against other countries in the 
SCS. Although indirect, Spratly militarization provides additional ports to PAFMM and 
CCG operations, extending diplomatic and economic effects hundreds of miles from 
mainland China. 
Overall, there was no direct economic benefit to China or the United States due to 
Spratly militarization. However, militarization gave China the ability to control a major 
avenue of trade as well as vast areas of natural resources. Though no evidence suggested 
quantifiable economic change, militarization likely bolstered China’s ability to coerce 
other claimants from utilizing natural resources in the SCS.  
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The overall impact of Spratly militarization on China-United States competition 
was most significant in information and military categories of DIME due to the increased 
coverage of ISR platforms and anti-ship missiles. The addition of bomber-capable airfields 
allowed China to operate a variety of ISR and anti-ship air platforms in areas that were out 
of range before 2015. Radar, SAM, and ASCM missile systems provided China with 
overlapping ISR and missile coverage of the southern half of the SCS. As summarized in 
Table 1, Spratly militarization affected competition neutrally and indirectly in the 
diplomatic and economic categories of DIME.  
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Table 1. Summary of Impact within DIME 
 
 
The diplomatic impact was ultimately neutral due to no quantifiable diplomatic 
change from East Asian or Southeast Asian countries, despite rhetoric from Vietnam and 
the Philippines. Zhang’s analysis of China as a “cautious bully” potentially suggests that 
militarization coerces other claimants below the line of conflict.168 Similarly, the 
economic impact was neutral because Spratly militarization did not directly result in 
economic benefit for China. However, militarization extended China’s ability to operate 
military, coast guard, and maritime militia vessels to protect its MSR as well as enforce 
China’s claims to fish, oil, and natural gas in the SCS. China’s neighbors felt threatened 
by the militarization but expected additional action from the United States in preventing 
China’s developments.  
  
 
168 Zhang, “Cautious Bully,” 117.  
58 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
59 
IV. SEA ASSURANCE AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
This thesis proposes a new term within maritime strategy: sea assurance. In the case 
of the Spratly Islands, China’s militarized outposts assure China’s ability to utilize the 
Spratly Islands and most of the southern SCS—not necessarily assurance to control, but 
rather assurance of advantage. Assurance exists when one country wields a discernible 
anti-ship advantage in a disputed area. As of the writing of this thesis, China holds a 
discernible anti-ship advantage in the Spratly Islands. Along with its capabilities in the 
Paracel Islands, Spratly militarization also assured China’s ability to control the SCS 
SLOC. This chapter explains the concept of sea assurance by defining sea assurance, 
exploring how it is achieved, and explaining why it matters. To illustrate the finer points 
of sea assurance, this chapter uses China’s militarization of the Spratlys as demonstration 
of sea assurance.  
A. SEA ASSURANCE DEFINED 
Sea assurance is the peacetime establishment of permanent or semi-permanent anti-
ship capability in disputed or international waters. Sea assurance is essentially the opposite 
of sea denial: instead of denying enemy access, sea assurance provides a broader 
protection—assurance—to the state that has accomplished it. Another way to understand sea 
assurance is as peacetime arrangements that increase a nation’s ability to achieve sea control 
in wartime. This peacetime fortification can act as a deterrent because it forces adversaries 
to reconsider the cost of battle and forces other claimants to evaluate the cost of defending 
their own claims. As a strategy, sea assurance is a goal or an end state. Through its 
militarization of the SCS, China has ensured security for its fishing and economic interests 
and expanded other elements of national power. To describe sea assurance more fully, this 
section dissects the critical aspects of the concept. “Sea” describes the relevant domain as 
distinct from air, space, land, or cyber. “Assurance” describes the effect of guaranteeing a 
country access to a portion of that domain. Three elements make sea assurance distinct from 
other maritime strategy concepts: use in peacetime, use of permanent or semi-permanent 
means, and coverage of non-territorial waters.  
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1. Peacetime 
The first element of sea assurance is its application only in peacetime. This makes 
sea assurance distinct from sea control and sea denial because those concepts only apply 
during wartime. As one might expect, it is impossible to militarily control an area if attack 
is not a viable option. While an attack may occur during peacetime, it generally signals the 
beginning of conflict instead of the perpetuation of peace. On sea control, Vego states, 
“perhaps it is needless to say that no country possesses sea control in peacetime. Struggle 
for sea control starts with the first encounter of the opposing forces in combat.”169 In 
addition to sea control, Vego suggests sea denial is not possible during peacetime. He 
states, “actions to deny control of the sea are carried out in case of a war at sea, not in 
peacetime.”170 Till, on the other hand, references the possibility of sea control in peacetime 
as a “strategic advantage,” but proceeds to discuss diplomatic applications of maritime 
force; he does not specify how a country may control the sea in peacetime.171 Aside from 
one reference from Till, maritime strategists tend to agree that sea control and sea denial 
only exist in wartime. Thus, China’s establishment of anti-ship capabilities in the Spratly’s 
would support sea control or sea denial in wartime, but those concepts do not accurately 
describe China’s militarization of the Spratlys during peacetime. 
2. Permanence 
The second element of sea assurance is the permanent or semi-permanent quality. 
From before Mahan, fleets have been considered the primary tools toward achieving sea 
control against other fleets.172 Ships are inherently transient while operating; they lack the 
ability to guard a given area on a permanent basis. However, they are reliant on permanent 
structures, ports. By building ports in disputed areas, a nation gains the ability to 
continuously operate their fleets beyond sovereign seas and extend the anti-ship 
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capabilities of those ships. Particularly as two sea-faring nations come closer to conflict, 
the methods and range of sea assurance may include transient assets (ships/aircraft) 
supported by permanent structures (ports/airfields). Because sea assurance ends once 
conflict begins, strategists must consider tactical assets for sea assurance if they fulfill a 
semi-permanent mission. While ships and aircraft are transient, persistent combat patrols 
by these platforms can enable a semi-permanent anti-ship capability covering disputed or 
international waters. The permanent ports and airfields built on China’s Big Three outposts 
enable China the option to wield a persistent anti-ship capability well beyond the SCS.  
When conflict is possible or likely, intent becomes a factor of maritime strategy. If 
the intent of positioning a semi-permanent anti-ship capability is to hold other forces at risk 
for a deterrent or coercive effect, then sea assurance is being exercised. On the contrary, if 
the intent is to attack another force (despite being in peacetime), preemptive sea control may 
be a better description for the activity. Aircraft can exercise sea assurance even though they 
are not inherently semi-permanent. The use of air patrols provides a persistent anti-ship 
capability. Thus, the individual aircraft is not a tool of sea assurance by itself, but the airfield 
providing persistent operations is. China’s Big Three outposts demonstrate this aspect of sea 
assurance. Each have permanent airfields and permanent missile bunkers capable of 
supporting mobile assets. When in place, these mobile missile systems and aircraft provide 
a semi-permanent, anti-ship capability that covers most of the southern SCS.  
3. Disputed/International Waters 
The third element of sea assurance concerns disputed or international waters versus 
recognized sovereign territory. If a nation establishes anti-ship capability on the mainland 
of its sovereign territory, it would be coastal defense; if the nation establishes the capability 
on a recognized, sovereign island, it would be island defense. Sea assurance is distinct 
because the country is establishing anti-ship capability outside its sovereign territory. In 
the case of China’s militarization of the Spratlys, China’s sea assurance efforts gave it 
recognized sovereign territory (12 nautical miles from the feature’s baseline) though not 
an EEZ claim. An anti-ship capability in a disputed area is not a prerequisite for sovereign 
territory, but sea assurance likely reduces another claimant’s options to overturn the claim. 
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Military capabilities aid China’s fait accompli strategy. As discussed in Chapter II, China 
seized Mischief Reef from the Philippines when it was a disputed feature, but now that 
China built up and militarized it, other countries recognize (or at least do not openly 
challenge) the territorial seas around Mischief Reef.  
B. SEA ASSURANCE ACHIEVED 
Sea assurance is achieved once a permanent or semi-permanent anti-ship capability 
is established in disputed or international waters. To have a credible anti-ship capability, 
two things are required: the ability to detect ships and the ability to attack them. A country 
may use several methods to achieve sea assurance depending on its technological 
capabilities and diplomatic situation. For example, China’s creation of features within 
disputed territory was possible because of dredging technology. Once China dredged 
enough dry land onto the features, building military infrastructure and installing radars 
were not substantially different from building such infrastructure on mainland China.  
In the Spratly Islands and SCS, China uses both outposts and maritime platforms 
to maintain sea assurance. China can detect foreign ships using radar on its outposts as well 
as PLAN, CCG, and PAFMM vessels (supported by port facilities on the outposts). China 
can attack those ships using ASCMs on the Big Three and missiles equipped on PLAN 
vessels. Within the Spratly and Paracel Islands, China has permanent sea assurance. By 
using PLAN vessels to monitor any foreign warship within the Nine Dash Line, China 
maintains semi-permanent sea assurance over the entire SCS.173 As of May 2021, China 
does not have ISR aircraft, bomber aircraft, nor anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) 
deployed to the Spratly outposts. Because of the airfields and aircraft support infrastructure 
built at the Big Three, China could deploy aircraft and ASBMs to the Spratlys within days. 
If China deployed enough aircraft to maintain persistent operations, China would gain the 
ability to detect and/or attack ships hundreds of miles beyond the Nine Dash Line, as 
 
173 Chinese shadowing operations in the South China Sea witnessed by the author during support to 
Freedom of Navigation Operations conducted in 2018.  
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depicted in Figures 7 and 8. If China deployed ASBMs to the Big Three, it would be able 
to attack ships as far away as Guam and Australia.174    
Similar to sea control, sea assurance is a fluid concept; however, unlike sea control, 
permanent sea assurance is possible. A country may use permanent anti-ship capabilities, 
such as land based ASCMs, or permanent structures that allow for persistent use of tactical 
assets, such as ports/airfields enabling ships/airplanes to operate. Some blurry areas exist 
with regard to conflict—for example, at what point are a country’s actions aggressive 
instead of guaranteeing its own access to the sea? Another blurry area is the level of 
dispute—how many other nations need to recognize sovereignty before the area is no 
longer in dispute? These questions are beyond the scope of the thesis but are valuable in 
seeking to determine the scope and effect of sea assurance in specific situations.  
C. THE VALUE OF SEA ASSURANCE 
In examining the importance of sea assurance, two underlying questions exist. First, 
why is it important as a concept? As a concept, sea assurance is important because it helps 
define a previously overlooked area of maritime strategy. It provides definable changes of 
the sea domain within peacetime. Anti-ship capabilities can act as a deterrent to conflict. If 
Nation X wants to challenge Nation Y in a disputed area, they must consider the probable 
conflict. If Nation Y achieves sea assurance in an area where Nation X has no anti-ship 
capability, Nation X must consider options other than conflict, including capitulation. In 
this example, sea assurance achieves a victory short of war. If capabilities between two 
countries are near peer, neither country could claim sea assurance and any pre-conflict 
considerations would require wargaming of potential sea control. As discussed in Chapter 
III, China’s strategy in the SCS largely exists in the gray zone, just short of conflict, thus 
preventing other nations from taking a firm stance against its actions. However, China’s 
slow but steady progression toward acquiring disputed features has had significant 
consequences—loss of territory by other claimants, increased threat to other claimants over 
resources, enhanced control of a major SLOC, etc. Sea assurance allows analysts and 
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policy makers to scrutinize China’s actions and define the limits of acceptable behavior in 
international waters.  
The second question is: why is sea assurance valuable to a country? In short, sea 
assurance involves a country establishing military capability beyond its sovereign territory. 
Doing so is beneficial for at least four reasons: de facto control of a disputed area, control 
of international sea lanes, deterrence of adversaries from operating in a body of water, and 
uninhibited expansion of capabilities useful in wartime. In the United States military, threat 
is widely regarded as a combination of capability and intent. Sea assurance allows a country 
to build capability during peacetime; once intent changes, ability to threaten changes 
simultaneously. China’s militarization of the Spratlys gave it permanent sea assurance 
around the disputed islands and supported semi-permanent sea assurance in the southern 
SCS. As a result, China deterred claimants (and the United States) from challenging its 
claims. China’s sea assurance also allowed China to protect its interests vis-a-vis the SCS 
SLOC and natural resources. Several indicators suggest sea assurance is part of China’s 
SCS strategy—administration of Zhongsha Islands, control of Scarborough Shoal, and 
PAFMM occupation at Whitsun Reef. These actions suggest China plans to expand its sea 
assurance of the SCS.  
In addition to what China already created and militarized, Bill Hayton speculates 
that China may be preparing to create additional islands from nothing near the center of 
the SCS.175 China recently authorized its Xisha District to administer both the Xisha 
Islands (Paracel Islands) and the Zhongsha Islands. This announcement by China is either 
in error or supports assumptions that China intends to develop and militarize as much of 
the SCS as it is allowed.176 The Zhongsha Islands are “known to the rest of the world as 
Macclesfield Bank, an underwater feature.”177 Hayton suggests the correct response is 
either ridicule for China’s mistake or concern “that China is attempting to rewrite 
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international law and claim bits of underwater seabed hundreds of miles from its 
shores.”178  
D. CONCLUSION 
Overall, China’s militarization of the Spratlys demonstrates the need for evaluation 
of existing maritime strategy concepts; its grey zone strategy in the SCS requires more 
defined concepts between peace and war. China is the first country to accomplish sea 
assurance by establishing permanent anti-ship capabilities within a disputed area. Each 
component of sea assurance differentiates it from other existing concepts while also 
accurately describing China’s activity in the SCS. This strategic concept relates to current 
events because countries, like China, seek to compete with global powers below the 
threshold of conflict. Though China is the first to accomplish this type of capability in 
disputed waters, other countries will likely attempt their own version of sea assurance 
unless halted by international law or direct conflict. Technological advancement allows for 
the creation of islands as well as the possibility for naval platforms to remain at sea for 
increasingly longer durations. These developments require a new way of considering 
strategy on the seas.  
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As detailed in this thesis, China’s militarization of the Spratly Islands had a 
significant, continuous impact on United States-China competition and demonstrated a 
new aspect of maritime strategy—a concept that this thesis defines as sea assurance. This 
chapter provides a summary of findings along with an examination of the hypotheses 
provided in Chapter I. Next, this chapter provides implications of these findings for United 
States policy. Finally, this chapter offers recommendations for future research.  
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The research for this thesis was designed to test three potential hypotheses to 
explain the impact of Chinese militarization of the Spratly Islands. Using the DIME model 
that considers the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic aspects of power, 
these hypotheses were that Spratly militarization was significant across all categories of 
DIME; significant in only two categories; or not significant at all. The findings of this 
research most align with hypothesis two, though not in the two categories expected. Spratly 
militarization has benefited China in the categories of information and military power. 
As discussed in Chapter III, Spratly militarization has had an impact on all four 
categories of Chinese power; however, China did not directly benefit diplomatically or 
economically based on the criteria used. Militarization did benefit China informationally 
as measured by change in current ISR coverage and capability of air ISR coverage. It also 
benefitted China militarily with a significant increase in permanent anti-ship missile 
coverage of the SCS and potential basing of military aircraft. This thesis used UN voting 
data as a metric for diplomatic effect and determined China did not benefit from Spratly 
militarization; however, if one considers China’s coercive strategy as a form of effective 
diplomacy, militarization likely benefited such a strategy. Similarly, China did not directly 
benefit economically from militarization; however, by covering most of the southern SCS 
with anti-ship missile coverage, China gained the ability to protect or control a major 
SLOC. This SLOC through the SCS is also vital to China’s broader economic ambitions 
vis-à-vis the Maritime Silk Road and BRI. These direct and indirect effects of Spratly 
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militarization demonstrate the value of a new form of maritime strategy called sea 
assurance.  
China’s militarization of the Spratly Islands marks a new chapter in maritime 
strategy. For the first time in history, a country has created new islands in a disputed area 
and equipped them with radar and anti-ship missiles. This dramatic change to existing 
maritime strategy has given China new capabilities that cannot be adequately described 
using traditional terms such as sea control or sea denial; China’s actions and its resultant 
increased maritime capabilities require consideration of a new name: sea assurance. Sea 
assurance can be seen as the opposite of sea denial: rather than simply denying the enemy 
fleet access, sea assurance provides a much broader umbrella of protection—assurance—
to the state that has accomplished it.  
Three specific characteristics are required for maritime activity to give a maritime 
power sea assurance: activities occur in peacetime, they are (semi)permanent, and they take 
place beyond territorial waters. Unlike sea control and sea denial, sea assurance only exists 
in peacetime. Unlike traditional maritime operations, maritime activity that can provide sea 
assurance is permanent, such as through the construction of islands, or semi-permanent, 
such as through persistent operations of transient platforms. And unlike coastal or island 
defense, sea assurance only exists in disputed or international waters.  
As the thesis title suggests, the most significant overarching result of China’s 
Spratly militarization is the establishment of sea assurance in most of the SCS. With fixed 
missile systems at the Big Three outposts (Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs), China 
holds persistent sea assurance of the Spratly Islands. With airfields long enough for ISR 
and bomber aircraft, China holds the potential for sea assurance as far as Singapore, the 
Celebes Sea, and beyond the Philippines. If China deployed ASBMs to the Big Three, it 
would hold sea assurance as far as Australia and Guam. Spratly militarization and 
subsequent sea assurance benefited China as a deterrent to other claimants and United 
States maritime operations in the SCS. Sea assurance in most of the SCS gives China the 
ability to control the SCS SLOC and protect its claims within the Nine Dash Line.  
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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY 
The findings of this thesis provide two valuable insights for United States policy: 
first, they help to understand China’s strategic trajectory in the SCS; and second, they 
suggest options for United States strategy in the SCS and elsewhere.  
China’s coercive strategy of militarizing disputed areas shows no sign of stopping. 
China’s behavior in the Paracels and Spratlys suggests China intends to establish sea 
assurance over the entire SCS, possibly by militarizing Scarborough Reef and Macclesfield 
Bank. As discussed in Chapter III, United States neutrality on sovereignty issues in the 
Spratlys weakened other claimants’ ability to resist Chinese coercion.  
To bolster relationships with its ASEAN partners, the United States should seek to 
deter China from further militarization of the SCS as well as increase sea assurance 
capabilities of the other Spratly claimants. By assisting other Spratly claimants in 
militarization of their own outposts, the United States could lead China to lose its monopoly 
on control of the region. One typical method the United States uses to limit China’s 
perception of control over a sovereign, archipelagic territory is through Freedom of 
Navigation Operations (FONOP).179 While United States FONOPs demonstrate a great 
power’s ability to transit non-sovereign territory, they have not prevented China from 
increasing its military capability in the region (e.g., YJ-12 ASCMs placed on the Big Three 
in 2018) nor occupying new disputed features (e.g., Whitsun Reef occupation by 
PAFMM).180 Therefore, in addition to continuing FONOPs and bolstering other claimant 
capability, the United States should engage the international community via the UN to 
determine the limits of acceptable behavior in disputed and international seas. As with the 
previously discussed UNCLOS and the 2016 tribunal ruling, the UN can decide the legality 
of nation’s occupying, building up, and militarizing disputed areas prior to international 
 
179 Typical U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations involve a U.S. warship operating just outside the 
territorial seas of another country. Eleanor Freund with Harvard’s Belfer Center provides a thorough 
explanation of Freedom of Navigation Operations conducted by the U.S. up to 2017 along with their intent 
in Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide, June 2017, 
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide. 
180 Heydarian, The Indo-Pacific, 151–152; Cruz de Castro, “Implications of the Recent Philippines-
China Naval Stand-Off,” 1.  
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arbitration of sovereignty.181 These decisions can be ignored, as demonstrated by China’s 
response to the 2016 tribunal ruling, but if the decisions are not made by an international 
body, China has no reason to change its current strategy. 
The second reason these findings are valuable is they provide the United States with 
new maritime strategy options. Assuming the UN makes no decision regarding 
establishment of anti-ship capabilities in disputed or international waters, the United States 
can also seek sea assurance either for itself or its partners. Specific to the Spratly Islands, 
the United States can support Philippine and Vietnamese expansion and upgrading of its 
outposts to deter potential Chinese coercion. The United States could also support 
Malaysian and Bruneian sea assurance efforts, though these countries may be less likely to 
counter China, as discussed in Chapter III. Beyond the SCS, the United States could 
support Japanese sea assurance at the Senkaku Islands. This suggestion may be 
controversial due to Japan’s aversion to appearing aggressive and the potential for 
escalation with China. On the other hand, United States inaction in the SCS ostensibly 
ceded the Spratlys to China; perhaps aggressive action, however controversial, is needed 
to deter Chinese occupation of disputed territories.  
For itself, the United States can consider methods of sea assurance as an extension 
of coastal defense for the continental United States or for its bases globally. As this thesis 
is being written in May 2021, it is perhaps inconceivable that the United States needs an in 
situ anti-ship capability to protect its interests; however, as the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency has described, the primary competitor to United States global power 
is actively expanding its “operational reach.”182 The United States must consider potential 
threats to its bases, trade routes, and sovereign territory. Due to enhanced missile 
technology, discussed in Chapter III, such threats can strike from hundreds of miles into 
international waters, putting strategic bases, such as Guam and Hawaii, at risk. Even within 
smaller seas like the Arabian Sea, United States forces can increase their defense capability 
 
181 Graham, “The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling,” 1.  
182 Defense Intelligence Agency, Worldwide Threat Assessment, (Washington, DC: Defense 
Intelligence Agency, April 26, 2021), 1. 
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by establishing anti-ship capabilities within international waters. The legality and potential 
escalation effects are murky, which has allowed China to assure its adjacent waters with 
little substantive backlash. To determine United States sea assurance options and limits to 
future Chinese sea assurance, United States-led international policy discussion is 
paramount.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis used specific criteria to measure the effects of China’s Spratly 
militarization and proposed a new maritime strategy concept; as such, there are numerous 
avenues of future research. The competitive relationship between the United States and 
China is extremely complicated, even when narrowed to the categories of DIME. Future 
research should evaluate United States-China competition in other geographic regions 
within the DIME framework.  
Each category of DIME represents additional areas of research related to the SCS. 
Diplomatically, future research may examine the individual relationships between China 
and the other claimants to help explain each nation’s behavior and help predict future 
behavior. As touched on in Chapter III, every claimant holds a variety of intertwining 
political interests related to the SCS. Future research should evaluate the role of 
international organizations—such as ASEAN and the UN—in the behavior displayed in 
the SCS. Future research should evaluate other informational aspects of power beyond ISR, 
e.g., media influence, intelligence collection, or public affairs. Militarily, future research 
could evaluate potential war scenarios between claimants and evaluate current military 
might compared with future aspirations or unexpected developments. Economically, future 
research could evaluate potential results of China’s resources exploration, potential limits 
on other claimant’s exploration, and the environmental impact of the resource struggles 
discussed in Chapter III. Future research may also focus on China’s BRI interests as related 
to the SCS and MSR. Lastly, using the DIME framework, future research could examine 
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China’s behavior as related to international relations theories such as realism, liberalism, 
and constructivism.183 
As a new concept, sea assurance offers a myriad of future research opportunities. 
Future research should consider historic examples that may apply to the criteria provided 
in this thesis and challenge the assertion made here that China’s actions in the Spratly 
Islands are unique. Furthermore, future research should evaluate the usefulness of sea 
assurance as a concept. Future research should examine potential ways for nations to 
achieve sea assurance. A number of developing technologies offer great power competitors 
the opportunity to create weapon systems with greater range, more efficient power 
consumption (e.g., nuclear and solar), and with limited or no personnel involved 
(autonomous and unmanned systems). These technologies combined have the potential to 
turn futuristic concepts of defense into reality. Finally, beyond the sea, future research 
should evaluate assurance in other domains. The key components of sea assurance—
permanence, peacetime, and disputed/international—also exist in air, space, and cyber 
domains. What would assurance in those domains look like and have they been attempted? 
Developments in space perhaps pose the best example of nations attempting to find 
cooperation regarding military activities in international domains.184 Competition between 
the United States and China is likely to persist in all domains for at least the next century. 
Future research should seek to be policy-relevant and focus on ways to achieve desirable 
outcomes.  
D. CONCLUSION 
China’s militarization of the Spratly Islands marked both a significant expansion of 
Chinese capability in the SCS and a new way of affecting the maritime domain. By forming 
new islands and equipping them with airfields, radars, and missiles, China overcame an 
obstacle to maritime strategy: impermanence. With its military outposts in disputed waters, 
 
183 A plethora of literature exists on each school of IR theory. For additional information on each 
school, see the works of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (realist); G. John Ikenberry and Robert 
Keohane (liberal); and Martha Finnemore and Alexander Wendt (constructivist).  
184 Dr. James Clay Moltz has written extensively on space capabilities development and the 
associated diplomatic aspects; see his Asia’s Space Race (2012) and The Politics of Space Security (2019).  
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China subverted outside opinion on its claims to sovereignty and laid the groundwork for 
similar resolution of its other disputed territories. In addition to solidifying its regional 
claims and protecting its economic interests, China demonstrated a new way to win the 
commons—sea assurance.  
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